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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are one of the most prominent tech-
nologies of our time, as they achieve state-of-the-art performance
in many machine learning tasks, including but not limited to image
classification, text mining, and speech processing. However, recent
research on DNNs has indicated ever-increasing concern on the
robustness to adversarial examples, especially for security-critical
tasks such as traffic sign identification for autonomous driving.
Studies have unveiled the vulnerability of a well-trained DNN by
demonstrating the ability of generating barely noticeable (to both
human and machines) adversarial images that lead to misclassifica-
tion. Furthermore, researchers have shown that these adversarial
images are highly transferable by simply training and attacking a
substitute model built upon the target model, known as a black-box
attack to DNNs.
Similar to the setting of training substitute models, in this paper
we propose an effective black-box attack that also only has access
to the input (images) and the output (confidence scores) of a tar-
geted DNN. However, different from leveraging attack transferabil-
ity from substitute models, we propose zeroth order optimization
(ZOO) based attacks to directly estimate the gradients of the tar-
geted DNN for generating adversarial examples. We use zeroth
order stochastic coordinate descent along with dimension reduc-
tion, hierarchical attack and importance sampling techniques to
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efficiently attack black-box models. By exploiting zeroth order op-
timization, improved attacks to the targeted DNN can be accom-
plished, sparing the need for training substitute models and avoid-
ing the loss in attack transferability. Experimental results onMNIST,
CIFAR10 and ImageNet show that the proposed ZOO attack is as
effective as the state-of-the-art white-box attack (e.g., Carlini and
Wagner’s attack) and significantly outperforms existing black-box
attacks via substitute models.
KEYWORDS
adversarial learning; black-box attack; deep learning; neural net-
work; substitute model
1 INTRODUCTION
The renaissance of artificial intelligence (AI) in the past few years
roots in the advancement of deep neural networks (DNNs). Recently,
DNNs have become an essential element and a core technique for
existing and emerging AI research, as DNNs have achieved state-of-
the-art performance and demonstrated fundamental breakthroughs
in many machine learning tasks that were once believed to be
challenging [24]. Examples include computer vision, image clas-
sification, machine translation, and speech processing, to name a
few.
Despite the success of DNNs, recent studies have identified that
DNNs can be vulnerable to adversarial examples - a slightly modi-
fied image can be easily generated and fool a well-trained image
classifier based on DNNs with high confidence [12, 40]. Conse-
quently, the inherent weakness of lacking robustness to adversarial
examples for DNNs brings out security concerns, especially for
mission-critical applications which require strong reliability, includ-
ing traffic sign identification for autonomous driving and malware
prevention [9, 16, 17], among others.
Preliminary studies on the robustness of DNNs focused on an
“open-box” (white-box) setting - they assume model transparency
that allows full control and access to a targeted DNN for sensitivity
analysis. By granting the ability of performing back propagation,
a technique that enables gradient computation of the output with
respect to the input of the targeted DNN, many standard algorithms
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such as gradient descent can be used to attack the DNN. In image
classification, back propagation specifies the effect of changing
pixel values on the confidence scores for image label prediction.
Unfortunately, most real world systems do not release their internal
configurations (including network structure and weights), so open-
box attacks cannot be used in practice.
Throughout this paper, we consider a practical “black-box” attack
setting where one can access the input and output of a DNN but
not the internal configurations. In particular, we focus on the use
case where a targeted DNN is an image classifier trained by a
convolutional neural network (CNN), which takes an image as an
input and produces a confidence score for each class as an output.
Due to application popularity and security implications, image
classification based on CNNs is currently a major focus and a critical
use case for studying the robustness of DNNs.
We consider two types of black-box attacks in this paper. Given
a benign example with correct labeling, an untargeted attack refers
to crafting an adversarial example leading to misclassification,
whereas a targeted attack refers to modifying the example in order
to be classified as a desired class. The effectiveness of our proposed
black-box attack (which we call ZOO) is illustrated in Figure 1. The
crafted adversarial examples from our attack not only successfully
mislead the targeted DNN but also deceive human perception as
the injected adversarial noise is barely noticeable. In an attacker’s
foothold, an adversarial example should be made as indistinguish-
able from the original example as possible in order to deceive a
targeted DNN (and sometimes human perception as well). How-
ever, the best metric for evaluating the similarity between a benign
example and a corresponding adversarial example is still an open
question and may vary in different contexts.
In what follows, we summarize recent works on generating and
defending adversarial examples for DNNs, and specify the “black-
box” setting of training substitute models for adversarial attacks.
1.1 Adversarial attacks and transferability
We summarize four principal open-box methods developed for at-
tacking image classification trained on DNNs as follows.
• Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [12]: Originated from an
L∞ constraint on the maximal distortion, FGSM uses the sign of
the gradient from the back propagation on a targeted DNN to gen-
erate admissible adversarial examples. FGSM has become a popular
baseline algorithm for improved adversarial example generation
[21, 22], and it can be viewed as an attack framework based on
first-order projected gradient descent [27].
• Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [36]: By con-
structing a Jacobian-based saliency map for characterizing the
input-output relation of a targeted DNN, JSMA can be viewed as
a greedy attack algorithm that iteratively modifies the most sig-
nificant pixel based on the saliency map for crafting adversarial
examples. Each iteration, JSMA recomputes the saliency map and
uses the derivative of the DNN with respect to the input image
as an indicator of modification for adversarial attacks. In addition
to image classification, JSMA has been applied to other machine
learning tasks such as malware classification [14], and other DNN
architectures such as recurrent neural networks (RNNs) [37].
• DeepFool [31]: Inspired from linear classification models and
(a) a ZOO black-box targeted attack example
(b) ZOO black-box untargeted attack examples
Figure 1: Visual illustration of our proposed black-box at-
tack (ZOO) to sampled images from ImageNet. The columns
from left to right are original images with correct labels, ad-
ditive adversarial noises from our attack, and crafted adver-
sarial images with misclassified labels.
the fact that the corresponding separating hyperplanes indicate
the decision boundaries of each class, DeepFool is an untargeted
attack algorithm that aims to find the least distortion (in the sense
of Euclidean distance) leading to misclassification, by projecting
an image to the closest separating hyperplane. In particular, an
approximate attack algorithm is proposed for DNNs in order to
tackle the inherit nonlinearity for classification [40].
• Carlini & Wagner (C&W) Attack [8]: The adversarial attack
proposed by Carlini and Wagner is by far one of the strongest
attacks. They formulate targeted adversarial attacks as an optimiza-
tion problem, take advantage of the internal configurations of a
targeted DNN for attack guidance, and use the L2 norm (i.e., Eu-
clidean distance) to quantify the difference between the adversarial
and the original examples. In particular, the representation in the
logit layer (the layer prior to the final fully connected layer as il-
lustrated in Figure 2) is used as an indicator of attack effectiveness.
Consequently, the C&W attack can be viewed as a gradient-descent
based targeted adversarial attack driven by the representation of
the logit layer of a targeted DNN and the L2 distortion. The formu-
lation of the C&W attack will be discussed in detail in Section 3.
Furthermore, Carlini and Wagner also showed that their attack can
Figure 2: Taxonomy of adversarial attacks to deep neural
networks (DNNs). “Back propagation” means an attacker
can access the internal configurations in DNNs (e.g., per-
forming gradient descent), and “Query” means an attacker
can input any sample and observe the corresponding output.
successfully bypass 10 different detections methods designed for
detecting adversarial examples [7].
• Transferability: In the context of adversarial attacks, transfer-
ability means that the adversarial examples generated from one
model are also very likely to be misclassified by another model.
In particular, the aforementioned adversarial attacks have demon-
strated that their adversarial examples are highly transferable from
one DNN at hand to the targeted DNN. One possible explanation
of inherent attack transferability for DNNs lies in the findings that
DNNs commonly have overwhelming generalization power and lo-
cal linearity for feature extraction [40]. Notably, the transferability
of adversarial attacks brings about security concerns for machine
learning applications based on DNNs, as malicious examples may
be easily crafted even when the exact parameters of a targeted DNN
are absent. More interestingly, the authors in [29] have shown that
a carefully crafted universal perturbation to a set of natural im-
ages can lead to misclassification of all considered images with
high probability, suggesting the possibility of attack transferability
from one image to another. Further analysis and justification of a
universal perturbation is given in [30].
1.2 Black-box attacks and substitute models
While the definition of an open-box (white-box) attack to DNNs is
clear and precise - having complete knowledge and allowing full
access to a targeted DNN, the definition of a “black-box” attack
to DNNs may vary in terms of the capability of an attacker. In an
attacker’s perspective, a black-box attack may refer to the most
challenging case where only benign images and their class labels
are given, but the targeted DNN is completely unknown, and one is
prohibited from querying any information from the targeted classi-
fier for adversarial attacks. This restricted setting, which we call a
“no-box” attack setting, excludes the principal adversarial attacks
introduced in Section 1.1, as they all require certain knowledge
and back propagation from the targeted DNN. Consequently, under
this no-box setting the research focus is mainly on the attack trans-
ferability from one self-trained DNN to a targeted but completely
access-prohibited DNN.
On the other hand, in many scenarios an attacker does have the
privilege to query a targeted DNN in order to obtain useful informa-
tion for crafting adversarial examples. For instance, a mobile app or
a computer software featuring image classification (mostly likely
trained by DNNs) allows an attacker to input any image at will and
acquire classification results, such as the confidence scores or rank-
ing for classification. An attacker can then leverage the acquired
classification results to design more effective adversarial examples
to fool the targeted classifier. In this setting, back propagation for
gradient computation of the targeted DNN is still prohibited, as
back propagation requires the knowledge of internal configurations
of a DNN that are not available in the black-box setting. However,
the adversarial query process can be iterated multiple times until an
attacker finds a satisfactory adversarial example. For instance, the
authors in [26] have demonstrated a successful black-box adversar-
ial attack to Clarifai.com, which is a black-box image classification
system.
Due to its feasibility, the case where an attacker can have free
access to the input and output of a targeted DNN while still be-
ing prohibited from performing back propagation on the targeted
DNN has been called a practical black-box attack setting for DNNs
[8, 16, 17, 26, 34, 35]. For the rest of this paper, we also refer a
black-box adversarial attack to this setting. For illustration, the
attack settings and their limitations are summarized in Figure 2. It
is worth noting that under this black-box setting, existing attacking
approaches tend to make use of the power of free query to train a
substitute model [17, 34, 35], which is a representative substitute of
the targeted DNN. The substitute model can then be attacked using
any white-box attack techniques, and the generated adversarial
images are used to attack the target DNN. The primary advantage
of training a substitute model is its total transparency to an at-
tacker, and hence essential attack procedures for DNNs, such as
back propagation for gradient computation, can be implemented on
the substitute model for crafting adversarial examples. Moreover,
since the substitute model is representative of a targeted DNN in
terms of its classification rules, adversarial attacks to a substitute
model are expected to be similar to attacking the corresponding
targeted DNN. In other words, adversarial examples crafted from a
substitute model can be highly transferable to the targeted DNN
given the ability of querying the targeted DNN at will.
1.3 Defending adversarial attacks
One common observation from the development of security-related
research is that attack and defense often come hand-in-hand, and
one’s improvement depends on the other’s progress. Similarly, in
the context of robustness of DNNs, more effective adversarial at-
tacks are often driven by improved defenses, and vice versa. There
has been a vast amount of literature on enhancing the robustness
of DNNs. Here we focus on the defense methods that have been
shown to be effective in tackling (a subset of) the adversarial attacks
introduced in Section 1.1 while maintaining similar classification
performance for the benign examples. Based on the defense tech-
niques, we categorize the defense methods proposed for enhancing
the robustness of DNNs to adversarial examples as follows.
• Detection-based defense: Detection-based approaches aim to
differentiate an adversarial example from a set of benign exam-
ples using statistical tests or out-of-sample analysis. Interested
readers can refer to recent works in [10, 13, 18, 28, 42, 43] and
references therein for details. In particular, feature squeezing is
shown to be effective in detecting adversarial examples by project-
ing an image to a confined subspace (e.g., reducing color depth of
a pixel) to alleviate the exploits from adversarial attacks [42, 43].
The success of detection-based approaches heavily relies on the
assumption that the distributions of adversarial and benign ex-
amples are fundamentally distinct. However, Carlini and Wagner
recently demonstrated that their attack (C&W attack) can bypass
10 different detection algorithms designed for detecting adversarial
examples [7], which challenges the fundamental assumption of
detection-based approaches as the results suggest that the distri-
butions of their adversarial examples and the benign examples are
nearly indistinguishable.
• Gradient and representation masking: As the use of gradi-
ents via back propagation on DNNs has been shown to be crucial
to crafting adversarial examples, one natural defense mechanism
is to hide the gradient information while training a DNN, known
as gradient masking. A typical example of gradient masking is the
defense distillation proposed in [38]. The authors proposed to re-
train a DNN using distillation [15] based on the original confidence
scores for classification (also known as soft labels) and introduced
the concept of “temperature” in the softmax step for gradient mask-
ing. An extended version has been proposed to enhance its defense
performance by incorporating model-agnostic uncertainty into re-
training [33]. Although the C&W attack has shown to be able to
break defensive distillation [8], it is still considered as a baseline
model for defending adversarial attacks. Another defense technique,
which we call representation masking, is inspired by the finding that
in the C&W attack the logit layer representation in DNNs is useful
for adversarial attacks. As a result, representation masking aims to
replace the internal representations in DNNs (usually the last few
layers) with robust representations to alleviate adversarial attacks.
For example, the authors in [6] proposed to integrate DNNs with
Gaussian processes and RBF kernels for enhanced robustness.
• Adversarial training: The rationale behind adversarial train-
ing is that DNNs are expected to be less sensitive to perturbations
(either adversarial or random) to the examples if these adversar-
ial examples are jointly used to stabilize training, known as the
data augmentation method. Different data augmentation methods
have been proposed to improve the robustness of DNNs. Interested
readers can refer to the recent works in [19, 27, 41, 44, 45] and the
references therein. Notably, the defense model proposed in [27]
showed promising results against adversarial attacks, including the
FGSM and the C&W attack. The authors formulated defense in
DNNs as a robust optimization problem, where the robustness is
improved by iterative adversarial data augmentation and retraining.
The results suggest that a DNN can be made robust at the price of
increased network capacity (i.e., more model parameters), in order
to stabilize training and alleviate the effect of adversarial examples.
1.4 Black-box attack using zeroth order
optimization: benefits and challenges
Zeroth order methods are derivative-free optimization methods,
where only the zeroth order oracle (the objective function value
f (x) at any x) is needed during optimization process. By evaluating
the objective function values at two very close points f (x + hv)
and f (x − hv) with a small h, a proper gradient along the direction
vector v can be estimated. Then, classical optimization algorithms
like gradient descent or coordinate descent can be applied using
the estimated gradients. The convergence of these zeroth order
methods has been proved in optimization literature [11, 25, 32], and
under mild assumptions (smoothness and Lipschitzian gradient)
they can converge to a stationary point with an extra error term
which is related to gradient estimation and vanishes when h → 0.
Our proposed black-box attack to DNNs in Section 3 is cast as
an optimization problem. It exploits the techniques from zeroth
order optimization and therefore spares the need of training a
substitute model for deploying adversarial attacks. Although it is
intuitive to use zeroth order methods to attack a black-box DNN
model, applying it naively can be impractical for large models. For
example, the Inception-v3 network [39] takes input images with a
size of 299 × 299 × 3, and thus has p = 268, 203 variables (pixels) to
optimize. To evaluate the estimated gradient of each pixel, we need
to evaluate the model twice. To just obtain the estimated gradients
of all pixels, 2p = 536, 406 evaluations are needed. For a model as
large as Inception-v3, each evaluation can take tens of milliseconds
on a single GPU, thus it is very expensive to even evaluate all
gradients once. For targeted attacks, sometimes we need to run an
iterative gradient descent with hundreds of iterations to generate
an adversarial image, and it can be forbiddingly expensive to use
zeroth order method in this case.
In the scenario of attacking black-box DNNs, especially when the
image size is large (the variable to be optimized has a large number
of coordinates), a single step of gradient descent can be very slow
and inefficient, because it requires estimating the gradients of all
coordinates to make a single update. Instead, we propose to use a
coordinate descent method to iteratively optimize each coordinate
(or a small batch of coordinates). By doing so, we can accelerate
the attack process by efficiently updating coordinates after only a
few gradient evaluations. This idea is similar to DNN training for
large datasets, where we usually apply stochastic gradient descent
using only a small subset of training examples for efficient updates,
instead of computing the full gradient using all examples to make
a single update. Using coordinate descent, we update coordinates
by small batches, instead of updating all coordinates in a single
update as in gradient descent. Moreover, this allows us to further
improve the efficiency of our algorithm by using carefully designed
sampling strategy to optimize important pixels first. We will discuss
the detailed algorithm in Section 3.
1.5 Contributions
We refer to the proposed attack method as black-box attacks using
zeroth order optimization, or ZOO for short. Below we summarize
our main contributions:
•We show that a coordinate descent based method using only the
zeroth order oracle (without gradient information) can effectively
attack black-box DNNs. Comparing to the substitute model based
black-box attack [35], ourmethod significantly increases the success
rate for adversarial attacks, and attains comparable performance to
the state-of-the-art white-box attack (C&W attack).
• In order to speed up the computational time and reduce number of
queries for our black-box attacks to large-scale DNNs, we propose
several techniques including attack-space dimension reduction,
hierarchical attacks and importance sampling.
• In addition to datasets of small image size (MNIST and CIFAR10),
we demonstrate the applicability of our black-box attack model to
a large DNN - the Inception-v3 model trained on ImageNet. Our
attack is capable of crafting a successful adversarial image within
a reasonable time, whereas the substitute model based black-box
attack in [35] only shows success in small networks trained on
MNIST and is hardly scalable to the case of ImageNet.
2 RELATEDWORK
The study of adversarial attacks roots in the need for understand-
ing the robustness of state-of-the-art machine learning models
[1, 2]. For instance, Biggio et el. proposed an effective attack to
sabotaging the performance (test accuracy) of support vector ma-
chines (SVMs) by intelligently injecting adversarial examples to the
training dataset [5]. Gradient based evasion attacks to SVMs and
multi-layer perceptrons are discussed in [4]. Given the popularity
and success of classification models trained by DNNs, in recent
years there has been a surge in interest toward understanding the
robustness of DNNs. A comprehensive overview of adversarial
attacks and defenses for DNNs is given in Section 1.
Here we focus on related work on the black-box adversarial
attack setting for DNNs. As illustrated in Figure 2, the black-box
setting allows free query from a targeted DNN but prohibits any
access to internal configurations (e.g., back propagation), which
fits well to the scenario of publicly accessible machine learning
services (e.g., mobile apps, image classification service providers,
and computer vision packages). Under this black-box setting, the
methodology of current attacks concentrates on training a sub-
stitute model and using it as a surrogate for adversarial attacks
[8, 16, 17, 26, 34, 35]. In other words, a black-box attack is made
possible by deploying a white-box attack to the substitute model.
Therefore, the effectiveness of such black-box adversarial attacks
heavily depends on the attack transferability from the substitute
model to the target model. Different from the existing approaches,
we propose a black-box attack via zeroth order optimization tech-
niques. More importantly, the proposed attack spares the need for
training substitute models by enabling a “pseudo back propagation”
on the target model. Consequently, our attack can be viewed “as if
it was” a white-box attack to the target model, and its advantage
over current black-box methods can be explained by the fact that it
avoids any potential loss in transferability from a substitute model.
The performance comparison between the existing methods and
our proposed black-box attack will be discussed in Section 4.
In principle, our black-box attack technique based on zeroth
order optimization is a general framework that can be applied to
any white-box attacks requiring back propagation on the targeted
DNN. We note that all the effective adversarial attacks discussed
in Section 1.1 have such a requirement, as back propagation on
a targeted DNN provides invaluable information for an attacker.
Analogously, one can view an attacker as an optimizer and an
adversarial attack as an objective function to be optimized. Back
propagation provides first-order evaluation (i.e., gradients) of the
objective function for the optimizer for efficient optimization. For
the purpose of demonstration, in this paper we proposed a black-
box attack based on the formulation of the C&W attack, since the
(white-box) C&W attack has significantly outperformed the other
attacks discussed in Section 1.1 in terms of the quality (distortion)
of the crafted adversarial examples and attack transferability [8].
Experimental results in Section 4 show that our black-box version
is as effective as the original C&W attack but at the cost of longer
processing time for implementing pseudo back propagation. We
also compare our black-box attack with the black-box attack via
substitute models in [35], which trains a substitute model as an
attack surrogate based on Jacobian saliency map [36]. Experimental
results in Section 4 show that our attack significantly outperforms
[35], which can be explained by the fact that our attack inherits the
effectiveness of the state-of-the-art C&W attack, and also by the
fact that zeroth order optimization allows direct adversarial attacks
to a targeted DNN and hence our black-box attack does not suffer
from any loss in attack transferability from a substitute model.
3 ZOO: A BLACK-BOX ATTACKWITHOUT
TRAINING SUBSTITUTE MODELS
3.1 Notation for deep neural networks
As illustrated in Figure 2, since we consider the black-box attack
setting where free query from a targeted DNN is allowed while
accessing to internal states (e.g., performing back propagation)
is prohibited, it suffices to use the notation F (x) to denote a tar-
geted DNN. Specifically, the DNN F (x) takes an image x ∈ Rp (a
p-dimensional column vector) as an input and outputs a vector
F (x) ∈ [0, 1]K of confidence scores for each class, where K is the
number of classes. The k-th entry [F (x)]k ∈ [0, 1] specifies the
probability of classifying x as class k , and
∑K
k=1[F (x)]k = 1.
In principle, our proposed black-box attack via zeroth order opti-
mization (ZOO) can be applied to non-DNN classifiers admitting the
same input and output relationship. However, since DNNs achieved
state-of-the-art classification accuracy in many image tasks, in this
paper we focus on the capability of our black-box adversarial attack
to DNNs.
3.2 Formulation of C&W attack
Our black-box attack is inspired by the formulation of the C&W
attack [8], which is one of the strongest white-box adversarial
attacks to DNNs at the time of our work. Given an image x0, let
x denote the adversarial example of x0 with a targeted class label
t toward misclassification. The C&W attack finds the adversarial
example x by solving the following optimization problem:
minimizex ∥x − x0∥22 + c · f (x, t) (1)
subject to x ∈ [0, 1]p ,
where ∥v∥2 =
√∑p
i=1v
2
i denotes the Euclidean norm (L2 norm) of
a vector v = [v1, . . . ,vp ]T , and c > 0 is a regularization parameter.
The first term ∥x−x0∥22 in (1) is the regularization used to enforce
the similarity between the adversarial example x and the image x0
in terms of the Euclidean distance, since x − x0 is the adversarial
image perturbation of x relative to x0. The second term c · f (x, t)
in (1) is the loss function that reflects the level of unsuccessful
adversarial attacks, and t is the target class. Carlini and Wagner
compared several candidates for f (x, t) and suggested the following
form for effective targeted attacks [8]:
f (x, t) = max{max
i,t
[Z (x)]i − [Z (x)]t ,−κ}, (2)
where Z (x) ∈ RK is the logit layer representation (logits) in the
DNN for x such that [Z (x)]k represents the predicted probability
that x belongs to class k , and κ ≥ 0 is a tuning parameter for
attack transferability. Carlini and Wagner set κ = 0 for attacking
a targeted DNN, and suggested large κ when performing transfer
attacks. The rationale behind the use of the loss function in (2) can
be explained by the softmax classification rule based on the logit
layer representation; the output (confidence score) of a DNN F (x)
is determined by the softmax function:
[F (x)]k =
exp([Z (x)]k )∑K
i=1 exp([Z (x)]i )
, ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (3)
Therefore, based on the softmax decision rule in (3),maxi,t [Z (x)]i−
[Z (x)]t ≤ 0 implies that the adversarial example x attains the high-
est confidence score for class t and hence the targeted attack is
successful. On the other hand,maxi,t [Z (x)]i − [Z (x)]t > 0 implies
that the targeted attack using x is unsuccessful. The role of κ en-
sures a constant gap between [Z (x)]t and maxi,t [Z (x)]i , which
explains why setting large κ is effective in transfer attacks.
Finally, the box constraint x ∈ [0, 1]p implies that the adversarial
example has to be generated from the valid image space. In practice,
every image can satisfy this box constraint by dividing each pixel
value by the maximum attainable pixel value (e.g., 255). Carlini and
Wagner remove the box constraint by replacing x with 1+tanhw2 ,
where w ∈ Rp . By using this change-of-variable, the optimization
problem in (1) becomes an unconstrained minimization problem
with w as an optimizer, and typical optimization tools for DNNs
(i.e., back propagation) can be applied for solving the optimal w
and obtain the corresponding adversarial example x.
3.3 Proposed black-box attack via zeroth order
stochastic coordinate descent
The attack formulation using (1) and (2) presumes a white-box
attack because (i): the logit layer representation in (2) is an inter-
nal state information of a DNN; and (ii) back propagation on the
targeted DNN is required for solving (1). We amend our attack to
the black-box setting by proposing the following approaches: (i)
modify the loss function f (x, t) in (1) such that it only depends on
the output F of a DNN and the desired class label t ; and (ii) compute
an approximate gradient using a finite difference method instead
of actual back propagation on the targeted DNN, and solve the
optimization problem via zeroth order optimization. We elucidate
these two approaches below.
• Loss function f (x, t) based on F : Inspired by (2), we propose
a new hinge-like loss function based on the output F of a DNN,
which is defined as
f (x, t) = max{max
i,t
log[F (x)]i − log[F (x)]t ,−κ}, (4)
where κ ≥ 0 and log 0 is defined as −∞. We note that log(·) is a
monotonic function such that for any x ,y ≥ 0, logy ≥ logx if and
only if y ≥ x . This implies that maxi,t log[F (x)]i − log[F (x)]t ≤ 0
means x attains the highest confidence score for class t . We find that
the log operator is essential to our black-box attack since very often
a well-trained DNN yields a skewed probability distribution on its
output F (x) such that the confidence score of one class significantly
dominates the confidence scores of the other classes. The use of the
log operator lessens the dominance effect while preserving the order
of confidence scores due to monotonicity. Similar to (2), κ in (4)
ensures a constant gap between maxi,t log[F (x)]i and log[F (x)]t .
For untargeted attacks, an adversarial attack is successful when
x is classified as any class other than the original class label t0.
A similar loss function can be used (we drop the variable t for
untargeted attacks):
f (x) = max{log[F (x)]t0 −maxi,t0 log[F (x)]i ,−κ}, (5)
where t0 is the original class label for x, and maxi,t0 log[F (x)]i
represents the most probable predicted class other than t0.
• Zeroth order optimization on the loss function:We discuss
our optimization techniques for any general function f used for
attacks (the regularization term in (1) can be absorbed as a part of
f ). We use the symmetric difference quotient [23] to estimate the
gradient ∂f (x)∂xi (defined as дˆi ):
дˆi B
∂ f (x)
∂xi
≈ f (x + hei ) − f (x − hei )2h , (6)
whereh is a small constant (we seth = 0.0001 in all our experiments)
and ei is a standard basis vector with only the i-th component as 1.
The estimation error (not including the error introduced by limited
numerical precision) is in the order of O(h2). Although numerical
accuracy is a concern, accurately estimating the gradient is usually
not necessary for successful adversarial attacks. One example is
FGSM, which only requires the sign (rather than the exact value)
of the gradient to find adversarial examples. Therefore, even if our
zeroth order estimations may not be very accurate, they suffice to
achieve very high success rates, as we will show in our experiments.
For any x ∈ Rp , we need to evaluate the objective function 2p
times to estimate gradients of all p coordinates. Interestingly, with
just one more objective function evaluation, we can also obtain the
coordinate-wise Hessian estimate (defined as hˆi ):
hˆi B
∂2 f (x)
∂x2ii
≈ f (x + hei ) − 2f (x) + f (x − hei )
h2
. (7)
Remarkably, since f (x) only needs to be evaluated once for all p
coordinates, we can obtain the Hessian estimates without additional
function evaluations.
It is worth noting that stochastic gradient descent and batch gra-
dient descent are two most commonly used algorithms for training
DNNs, and the C&W attack [8] also used gradient descent to attack
a DNN in the white-box setting. Unfortunately, in the black-box
setting, the network structure is unknown and the gradient compu-
tation via back propagation is prohibited. To tackle this problem, a
naive solution is applying (6) to estimate gradient, which requires
2p objective function evaluations. However, this naive solution is
too expensive in practice. Even for an input image size of 64×64×3,
one full gradient descent step requires 24, 576 evaluations, and typ-
ically hundreds of iterations may be needed until convergence. To
resolve this issue, we propose the following coordinate-wise update,
which only requires 2 function evaluations for each step.
• Stochastic coordinate descent: Coordinate descentmethods
have been extensively studied in optimization literature [3]. At
each iteration, one variable (coordinate) is chosen randomly and is
Algorithm 1 Stochastic Coordinate Descent
1: while not converged do
2: Randomly pick a coordinate i ∈ {1, . . . ,p}
3: Compute an update δ∗ by approximately minimizing
argmin
δ
f (x + δei )
4: Update xi ← xi + δ∗
5: end while
updated by approximately minimizing the objective function along
that coordinate (see Algorithm 1 for details). The most challenging
part in Algorithm 1 is to compute the best coordinate update in
step 3. After estimating the gradient and Hessian for xi , we can
use any first or second order method to approximately find the
best δ . In first-order methods, we found that ADAM [20]’s update
rule significantly outperforms vanilla gradient descent update and
other variants in our experiments, so we propose to use a zeroth-
order coordinate ADAM, as described in Algorithm 2. We also use
Newton’s method with both estimated gradient and Hessian to
update the chosen coordinate, as proposed in Algorithm 3. Note
that when Hessian is negative (indicating the objective function is
concave along direction xi ), we simply update xi by its gradient.
We will show the comparison of these two methods in Section 4.
Experimental results suggest coordinate-wise ADAM is faster than
Newton’s method.
Algorithm 2 ZOO-ADAM: Zeroth Order Stochastic Coordinate
Descent with Coordinate-wise ADAM
Require: Step size η, ADAM states M ∈ Rp ,v ∈ Rp ,T ∈ Zp ,
ADAM hyper-parameters β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999, ϵ = 10−8
1: M ← 0,v ← 0,T ← 0
2: while not converged do
3: Randomly pick a coordinate i ∈ {1, · · · ,p}
4: Estimate дˆi using (6)
5: Ti ← Ti + 1
6: Mi ← β1Mi + (1 − β1)дˆi , vi ← β2vi + (1 − β2)дˆ2i
7: Mˆi = Mi/(1 − βTi1 ), vˆi = vi/(1 − βTi2 )
8: δ∗ = −η Mˆi√
vˆi+ϵ
9: Update xi ← xi + δ∗
10: end while
Note that for algorithmic illustration we only update one coor-
dinate for each iteration. In practice, to achieve the best efficiency
of GPU, we usually evaluate the objective in batches, and thus a
batch of дˆi and hˆi can be estimated. In our implementation we
estimate B = 128 pixels’ gradients and Hessians per iteration, and
then update B coordinates in a single iteration.
3.4 Attack-space dimension reduction
We first define ∆x = x−x0 and ∆x ∈ Rp to be the adversarial noise
added to the original image x0. Our optimization procedure starts
with ∆x = 0. For networks with a large input size p, optimizing
over Rp (we call it attack-space) using zeroth order methods can be
quite slow because we need to estimate a large number of gradients.
Algorithm 3 ZOO-Newton: Zeroth Order Stochastic Coordinate
Descent with Coordinate-wise Newton’s Method
Require: Step size η
1: while not converged do
2: Randomly pick a coordinate i ∈ {1, · · · ,p}
3: Estimate дˆi and hˆi using (6) and (7)
4: if hˆi ≤ 0 then
5: δ∗ ← −ηдˆi
6: else
7: δ∗ ← −η дˆi
hˆi
8: end if
9: Update xi ← xi + δ∗
10: end while
Instead of directly optimizing ∆x ∈ Rp , we introduce a dimen-
sion reduction transformation D(y) where y ∈ Rm , ranдe(D) ∈ Rp ,
andm < p. The transformation can be linear or non-linear. Then,
we use D(y) to replace ∆x = x − x0 in (1):
minimizey ∥D(y)∥22 + c · f (x0 + D(y), t) (8)
subject to x0 + D(y) ∈ [0, 1]p .
The use of D(y) effectively reduces the dimension of attack-space
from p tom. Note that we do not alter the dimension of an input im-
age x but only reduce the permissible dimension of the adversarial
noise. A convenient transformation is to defineD to be the upscaling
operator that resizes y as a size-p image, such as the bilinear inter-
polation method1. For example, in the Inception-v3 network y can
be a small adversarial noise image with dimensionm = 32 × 32 × 3,
while the original image dimension is p = 299 × 299 × 3. Other
transformations like DCT (discrete cosine transformation) can also
be used. We will show the effectiveness of this method in Section 4.
3.5 Hierarchical attack
When applying attack-space dimension reduction with a smallm,
although the attack-space is efficient to optimize using zeroth order
methods, a valid attack might not be found due to the limited search
space. Conversely, if a largem is used, a valid attack can be found
in that space, but the optimization process may take a long time.
Thus, for large images and difficult attacks, we propose to use a
hierarchical attack scheme, where we use a series of transforma-
tions D1,D2 · · · with dimensionsm1,m2, · · · to gradually increase
m during the optimization process. In other words, at a specific
iteration j (according to the dimension increasing schedule) we set
yj = D−1i (Di−1(yj−1)) to increase the dimension of y frommi−1 to
mi (D−1 denotes the inverse transformation of D).
For example, when using image scaling as the dimension reduc-
tion technique, D1 upscales y fromm1 = 32×32×3 to 299×299×3,
and D2 upscales y fromm2 = 64 × 64 × 3 to 299 × 299 × 3. We start
withm1 = 32 × 32 × 3 variables to optimize with and use D1 as the
transformation, then after a certain number of iterations (when the
decrease in the loss function is inapparent, indicating the need of a
larger attack-space), we upscale y from 32 × 32 × 3 to 64 × 64 × 3,
and use D2 for the following iterations.
1See the details at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilinear_interpolation
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Figure 3: Attacking the bagel image in Figure 1 (a) with importance sampling. Top: Pixel values in certain parts of the bagel
image have significant changes in RGB channels, and the changes in the R channel is more prominent than other channels.
Here the attack-space is 32 × 32 × 3. Although our targeted attack in this attack-space fails, its adversarial noise provides
important clues to pixel importance. We use the noise from this attack-space to sample important pixels after we increase
the dimension of attack-space to a larger dimension. Bottom: Importance sampling probability distribution for 64 × 64 × 3
attack-space. The importance is computed by taking the absolute value of pixel value changes, running a 4 × 4 max-pooling
for each channel, up-sampling to the dimension of 64 × 64 × 3, and normalizing all values.
3.6 Optimize the important pixels first
One benefit of using coordinate descent is that we can choose which
coordinates to update. Since estimating gradient and Hessian for
each pixel is expensive in the black-box setting, we propose to
selectively update pixels by using importance sampling. For example,
pixels in the corners or at the edges of an image are usually less
important, whereas pixels near the main object can be crucial for a
successful attack. Therefore, in the attack process we sample more
pixels close to the main object indicated by the adversarial noise.
We propose to divide the image into 8×8 regions, and assign sam-
pling probabilities according to how large the pixel values change
in that region. We run a max pooling of the absolute pixel value
changes in each region, up-sample to the desired dimension, and
then normalize all values such that they sum up to 1. Every few
iterations, we update these sampling probabilities according to the
recent changes. In Figure 3, we show a practical example of pixel
changes and how importance sampling probabilities are generated
when attacking the bagel image in Figure 1 (a).
When the attack-space is small (for example, 32 × 32 × 3), we do
not use importance sampling to sufficiently search the attack-space.
When we gradually increase the dimension of attack-space using
hierarchical attack, incorporating importance sampling becomes
crucial as the attack-space is increasingly larger. We will show the
effectiveness of importance sampling in Section 4.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
4.1 Setup
We compare our attack (ZOO) with Carlini & Wagner’s (C&W)
white-box attack [8] and the substitute model based black-box
attack [35]. We would like to show that our black-box attack can
achieve similar success rate and distortion as the white-box C&W
attack, and can significantly outperform the substitute model based
black-box attack, while maintaining a reasonable attack time.
Our experimental setup is based on Carlini & Wagner’s frame-
work2 with our ADAM and Newton based zeroth order optimizer
included. For substitute model based attack, we use the reference
implementation (with necessary modifications) in CleverHans3 for
comparison. For experiments on MNIST and CIFAR, we use a Intel
Xeon E5-2690v4 CPU with a single NVIDIA K80 GPU; for experi-
ments on ImageNet, we use a AMD Ryzen 1600 CPU with a single
NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti GPU. Our experimental code is publicly avail-
able4. For implementing zeroth order optimization, we use a batch
size of B = 128; i.e., we evaluate 128 gradients and update 128
coordinates per iteration. In addition, we set κ = 0 unless specified.
4.2 MNIST and CIFAR10
DNN Model. For MNIST and CIFAR10, we use the same DNN
model as in the C&W attack ([8], Table 1). For substitute model
based attack, we use the same DNNmodel for both the target model
2https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_attacks
3https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/blob/master/tutorials/mnist_blackbox.py
4https://github.com/huanzhang12/ZOO-Attack
Table 1: MNIST and CIFAR10 attack comparison: ZOO attains comparable success rate and L2 distortion as the white-box C&W
attack, and significantly outperforms the black-box substitute model attacks using FGSM (L∞ attack) and the C&W attack [35].
The numbers in parentheses in Avg. Time field is the total time for training the substitutemodel. For FGSMwe do not compare
its L2 with other methods because it is an L∞ attack.
MNIST
Untargeted Targeted
Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time (per attack) Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time (per attack)
White-box (C&W) 100 % 1.48066 0.48 min 100 % 2.00661 0.53 min
Black-box (Substitute Model + FGSM) 40.6 % - 0.002 sec (+ 6.16 min) 7.48 % - 0.002 sec (+ 6.16 min)
Black-box (Substitute Model + C&W) 33.3 % 3.6111 0.76 min (+ 6.16 min) 26.74 % 5.272 0.80 min (+ 6.16 min)
Proposed black-box (ZOO-ADAM) 100 % 1.49550 1.38 min 98.9 % 1.987068 1.62 min
Proposed black-box (ZOO-Newton) 100 % 1.51502 2.75 min 98.9 % 2.057264 2.06 min
CIFAR10
Untargeted Targeted
Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time (per attack) Success Rate Avg. L2 Avg. Time (per attack)
White-box (C&W) 100 % 0.17980 0.20 min 100 % 0.37974 0.16 min
Black-box (Substitute Model + FGSM) 76.1 % - 0.005 sec (+ 7.81 min) 11.48 % - 0.005 sec (+ 7.81 min)
Black-box (Substitute Model + C&W) 25.3 % 2.9708 0.47 min (+ 7.81 min) 5.3 % 5.7439 0.49 min (+ 7.81 min)
Proposed Black-box (ZOO-ADAM) 100 % 0.19973 3.43 min 96.8 % 0.39879 3.95 min
Proposed Black-box (ZOO-Newton) 100 % 0.23554 4.41 min 97.0 % 0.54226 4.40 min
and the substitute model. If the architecture of a targeted DNN is
unknown, black-box attacks based on substitute models will yield
worse performance due to model mismatch.
Target images. For targeted attacks, we randomly select 100 im-
ages from MNIST and CIFAR10 test sets, and skip the original
images misclassified by the target model. For each image, we apply
targeted attacks to all 9 other classes, and thus there are 900 attacks
in total. For untargeted attacks, we randomly select 200 images
from MNIST and CIFAR10 test sets.
Parameter setting. For both ours and the C&W attack, we run a
binary search up to 9 times to find the best c (starting from 0.01),
and terminate the optimization process early if the loss does not
decrease for 100 iterations. We use the same step size η = 0.01
and ADAM parameters β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 for all methods. For
the C&W attack, we run 1,000 iterations; for our attack, we run
3,000 iterations for MNIST and 1,000 iterations for CIFAR. Note
that our algorithm updates far less variables because for each it-
eration we only update 128 pixels, whereas in the C&W attack all
pixels are updated based on the full gradient in one iteration due
to the white-box setting. Also, since the image size of MNIST and
CIFAR10 is small, we do not reduce the dimension of attack-space
or use hierarchical attack and importance sampling. For training
the substitute model, we use 150 hold-out images from the test set
and run 5 Jacobian augmentation epochs, and set the augmentation
parameter λ = 0.1. We implement FGSM and the C&W attack on
the substitute model for both targeted and untargeted transfer at-
tacks to the black-box DNN. For FGSM, the perturbation parameter
ϵ = 0.4, as it is shown to be effective in [35]. For the C&W attack,
we use the same settings as the white-box C&W, except for setting
κ = 20 for attack transferability and using 2,000 iterations.
Other tricks.When attacking MNIST, we found that the change-
of-variable via tanh can cause the estimated gradients to vanish due
to limited numerical accuracy when pixel values are close to the
boundary (0 or 1). Alternatively, we simply project the pixel values
within the box constraints after each update for MNIST. But for
CIFAR10, we find that using change-of-variable converges faster,
as most pixels are not close to the boundary.
Results. As shown in Table 1, our proposed attack (ZOO) achieves
nearly 100% success rate. Furthermore, the L2 distortions are also
close to the C&W attack, indicating our black-box adversarial im-
ages have similar quality as the white-box approach (Figures 4 and
5). Notably, our success rate is significantly higher than the sub-
stitute model based attacks, especially for targeted attacks, while
maintaining reasonable average attack time. When transferring at-
tacks from the substitute models to the target DNN, FGSM achieves
better success rates in some experiments because it uses a relatively
large ϵ = 0.4 and introduces much more noise than C&W attack.
We also find that ADAM usually works better than the Newton’s
method in terms of computation time and L2 distortion.
4.3 Inception network with ImageNet
Attacking a large black-box network like Inception-v3 [39] can be
challenging due to large attack-space and expensive model evalua-
tion. Black-box attacks via substitute models become impractical
in this case, as a substitute model with a large enough capacity
relative to Inception-V3 is needed, and a tremendous amount of
costly Jacobian data augmentation is needed to train this model.
On the other hand, transfer attacks may suffer from lower success
rate comparing to white-box attacks, especially for targeted attacks.
Here we apply the techniques proposed in Section 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6
to efficiently overcome the optimization difficulty toward effective
and efficient black-box attacks.
• Untargeted black-box attacks to Inception-v3.
Target images.We use 150 images from the ImageNet test set for
untargeted attacks. To justify the effectiveness of using attack-space
dimension reduction, we exclude small images in the test set and
ensure that all the original images are at least 299 × 299 in size. We
also skip all images that are originally misclassified by Inception-v3.
Attack techniques and parameters.We use an attack-space of
only 32×32×3 (the original input space is 299×299×3) and do not
(a) (b) White-box C&W attack (c) ZOO-ADAM black-box attack (d) ZOO-Newton black-box attack
Figure 4: Visual comparison of successful adversarial examples in MNIST. Each row displays crafted adversarial examples
from the sampled images in (a). Each column in (b) to (d) indexes the targeted class for attack (digits 0 to 9).
(a) (b) White-box C&W attack (c) ZOO-ADAM black-box attack (d) ZOO-Newton black-box attack
Figure 5: Visual comparison of successful adversarial examples in CIFAR10. Each row displays crafted adversarial examples
from the sampled images in (a). Each column in (b) to (d) indexes the targeted class for attack.
Table 2: Untargeted ImageNet attacks comparison. Substi-
tute model based attack cannot easily scale to ImageNet.
Success Rate Avg. L2
White-box (C&W) 100 % 0.37310
Proposed black-box (ZOO-ADAM) 88.9 % 1.19916
Black-box (Substitute Model) N.A. N.A.
use hierarchical attack. We also set a hard limit of 1, 500 iterations
for each attack, which takes about 20 minutes per attack in our
setup. In fact, during 1, 500 iterations, only 1500 × 128 = 192, 000
gradients are evaluated, which is even less than the total number of
pixels (299× 299× 3 = 268, 203) of the input image. We fix c = 10 in
all Inception-v3 experiments, as it is too costly to do binary search
in this case. For both C&W and our attacks, we use step size 0.002.
Results. We compare the success rate and average L2 distortion
between our ZOO attack and the C&W white-box attack in Table 2.
Despite running only 1,500 iterations (within 20 minutes per image)
and using a small attack-space (32 × 32 × 3), our black-box attack
achieves about 90% success rate. The average L2 distortion is about
3 times larger than the white-box attack, but our adversarial images
are still visually indistinguishable (Figures 1). The success rate and
distortion can be further improved if we run more iterations.
• Targeted black-box attacks to Inception-v3.
For Inception-v3, a targeted attack is much more difficult as there
are 1000 classes, and a successful attack means one can manipulate
the predicted probability of any specified class. However, we report
that using our advanced attack techniques, 20, 000 iterations (each
with B = 128 pixel updates) are sufficient for a hard targeted attack.
Target image.We select an image (Figure 1 (a)) for which our un-
targeted attack failed, i.e., we cannot even find an untargeted attack
in the 32 × 32 × 3 attack-space, indicating that this image is hard to
attack. Inception-v3 classifies it as a “bagel” with 97.0% confidence,
and other top-5 predictions include “guillotine”, “pretzel”, “Granny
Smith” and “dough” with 1.15%, 0.07%, 0.06% and 0.01% confidence.
We deliberately make the attack even harder by choosing the target
class as “grand piano”, with original confidence of only 0.0006%.
Attack techniques.We use attack-space dimension reduction as
well as hierarchical attack. We start from an attack-space of 32 ×
32×3, and increase it to 64×64×3 and 128×128×3 at iteration 2,000
and 10,000, respectively. We run the zeroth order ADAM solver
(Algorithm 2) with a total of 20,000 iterations, taking about 260
minutes in our setup. Also, when the attack space is greater than
32×32×3, we incorporate importance sampling, and keep updating
the sampling probability after each iteration.
Reset ADAM states.We report an additional trick to reduce the
final distortion - reset the ADAM solver’s states when a first valid
Figure 6: Left: total loss ∥x − x0∥22 + c · f (x, t) versus iterations. Right: c · f (x, t) versus iterations (log y-scale). When c · f (x, t)
reaches 0, a valid attack is found. With all techniques applied, the first valid attack is found at iteration 15, 227. The optimizer
then continues tominimize ∥x−x0∥22 to reduce distortion. In the right figure we do not show the curve without resetting ADAM
states because we reset ADAM states only when c · f (x, t) reaches 0 for the first time.
Table 3: Comparison of different attack techniques. “First
Valid” indicates the iteration numberwhere the first success-
ful attack was found during the optimization process.
Black-box (ZOO-ADAM) Success? First Valid Final L2 Final Loss
All techniques Yes 15,227 3.425 11.735
No Hierarchical Attack No - - 62.439
No importance sampling Yes 17,403 3.63486 13.216
No ADAM state reset Yes 15,227 3.47935 12.111
attack is found during the optimization process. The reason is as
follows. The total loss consists of two parts: l1 B c · f (x, t) and
l2 B ∥x−x0∥22 . l1 measures the difference between the original class
probability Porig and targeted class probability Ptarget as defined in
(4). When l1 = 0, Porig ≤ Ptarget, and a valid adversarial example
is found. l2 is the L2 distortion. During the optimization process,
we observe that before l1 reaches 0, l2 is likely to increase, i.e.,
adding more distortion and getting closer to the target class. After
l1 reaches 0 it cannot go below 0 because it is a hinge-like loss, and at
this point the optimizer should try to reduce l2 as much as possible
while keeping Ptarget only slightly larger than Porig. However, when
we run coordinate-wise ADAM, we found that even after l1 reaches
0, the optimizer still tries to reduce Porig and to increase Ptarget, and
l2 will not be decreased efficiently. We believe the reason is that
the historical gradient statistics stored in ADAM states are quite
stale due to the large number of coordinates. Therefore, we simply
reset the ADAM states after l1 reaches 0 for the first time in order
to make the solver focus on decreasing l2 afterwards.
Results. Figure 6 shows how the loss decreases versus iterations,
with all techniques discussed above applied in red; other curves
show the optimization process without a certain technique but all
others included. The black curve decreases very slowly, suggesting
hierarchical attack is extremely important in accelerating our attack,
otherwise the large attack-space makes zeroth order methods infea-
sible. Importance sampling also makes a difference especially after
iteration 10,000 – when the attack-space is increased to 128×128×3;
it helps us to find the first valid attack over 2,000 iterations earlier,
thus leaving more time for reducing the distortion. The benefit of
reseting ADAM states is clearly shown in Table 3, where the final
distortion and loss increase noticeably if we do not reset the states.
The proposed ZOO attack succeeds in decreasing the probability
of the original class by over 160x (from 97% to about 0.6%) while
increasing the probability of the target class by over 1000x (from
0.0006% to over 0.6%, which is top-1) to achieve a successful attack.
Furthermore, as shown in Figures 1, the crafted adversarial noise is
almost negligible and indistinguishable by human eyes.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper proposed a new type of black-box attacks named ZOO
to DNNs without training any substitute model as an attack surro-
gate. By exploiting zeroth order optimization for deploying pseudo
back propagation on a targeted black-box DNN, experimental re-
sults show that our attack attains comparable performance to the
state-of-the-art white-box attack (Carlini and Wagner’s attack). In
addition, our black-box attack significantly outperforms the substi-
tute model based black-box attack in terms of attack success rate
and distortion, as our method does not incur any performance loss
in attack transferability. Furthermore, we proposed several acceler-
ation techniques for applying our attack to large DNNs trained on
ImageNet, whereas the substitute model based black-box attack is
hardly scalable to a large DNN like Inception-v3.
Based on the analysis and findings from the experimental results
on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet, we discuss some potential re-
search directions of our black-box adversarial attacks as follows.
• Accelerated black-box attack: although our black-box attack
spares the need for training substitution models and attains compa-
rable performance to thewhite-box C&Wattack, in the optimization
process it requires more iterations than a white-box attack due to
additional computation for approximating the gradient of a DNN
and for performing pseudo back propagation. In addition to the
computation acceleration tricks proposed in Section 3, a data-driven
approach that take these tricks into consideration while crafting an
adversarial example can make our black-box attack more efficient.
• Adversarial training using our black-box attack: adversarial train-
ing in DNNs is usually implemented in a white-box setting - gen-
erating adversarial examples from a DNN to stabilize training and
making the retrained model more robust to adversarial attacks. Our
black-box attack can serve as an independent indicator of the ro-
bustness of a DNN for adversarial training.
• Black-box attacks in different domains: in this paper we explicitly
demonstrated our black-box attack to image classifiers trained by
DNNs. A natural extension is adapting our attack to other data
types (e.g., speeches, time series, graphs) and different machine
learning models and neural network architectures (e.g., recurrent
neural networks). In addition, how to incorporate side information
of a dataset (e.g., expert knowledge) and existing adversarial exam-
ples (e.g., security leaks and exploits) into our black-box attack is
worthy of further investigation.
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Figure 7: Additional visual illustration of black-box untargeted attacks using ZOO-ADAM, sampled from ImageNet test set.
The columns from left to right are original images with correct labels, additive adversarial noises from our attack (gray color
means no modification), and crafted adversarial images with misclassified labels.
APPENDIX
Figure 7 displays some additional adversarial examples in ImageNet
from our untargeted attack.
